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From Impasse to Recovery: 
Overcoming Europe’s Prolonged Crisis
Despite recent hopes for economic revival, stagnation 
continues to plague most countries in the European Union. 
Results of the recent European elections confirm that 
many people are turning against the EU and its policies. 
Throughout the continent economic growth is tepid, 
unemployment is stubbornly high in most countries and 
real wages remain low. Meanwhile, government benefits 
are being slashed in order to reduce debt burdens. 
Europe appears to be trapped in an economic impasse. 
Many people feel that national governments—and 
EU institutions in particular—are not responding to 
their needs. Some have started to blame convenient 
scapegoats, such as immigrants. 
Is there a viable way out of this economic and political 
crisis? This Policy Brief sketches out the broad outlines of a 
feasible economic strategy. It draws on the contributions 
of a recently published Memorandum (‘Charting Ways 
out of Europe’s Impasse’), which has summarised, in turn, 
the general findings of a recent three-year EC research 
programme called the AUGUR project.1
A Brief Background
In the two decades leading up to the 2009 economic crisis, 
there had been a substantial convergence of levels of 
income per capita across Europe. Part of the explanation 
was that capital flows among countries counter-balanced 
divergent trade performances. 
But trends in trade competitiveness began to diverge more 
sharply after 2000, especially among the countries that 
shared the euro. For example, France, Italy and Spain—as 
well as the UK—began to lose ground to Germany and 
other successful exporting countries. 
1 The Memorandum has been published by the Vienna Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies. See ‘Charting Ways Out of Europe’s Impasse 
- A Policy Memorandum, wiiw Policy Note/Policy Report 13, Vienna, June 
2014’. The Memorandum was based on contributions from Francis Cripps 
(Alphametrics), Michael Landesmann (wiiw), Jacques Mazier (Paris-Nord), 
Robert McDowell (Summerhall), Terry McKinley (SOAS), Pascal Petit (Paris 
Nord), Terry Ward (Applica) and Enrico Wolleb (ISMERI). This Policy Brief was 
written for CDPR by Terry McKinley in consultation with Francis Cripps. Also 
see the Endnote.  
The primary factor was widening disparities across 
countries in the exports of manufactures. This trade 
component alone accounted for about half of all cross-
border income flows within Europe.
Because the countries running current-account deficits 
had to finance them by capital inflows, they began to face 
rising debt levels. Yet the Maastricht Treaty had obliged 
governments to budget for deficits not exceeding 3% of 
GDP and debt levels not exceeding 60% of GDP. 
The Treaty on Stability in 2012 strengthened such 
conservative budgeting, mandating governments to work 
towards structural budget deficits of no more than 0.5% of 
GDP. But the fiscal austerity that has already resulted from 
seeking to abide by such objectives not only continues 
to aggravate economic disparities within Europe but also 
consigns the entire continent to prolonged stagnation. 
Projections to 2020 and 2030 by a global macroeconomic 
model (the CAM, which was used extensively in the 
AUGUR EC project) suggest that levels of GDP per capita in 
Germany, other surplus countries in Western Europe and 
the Nordic countries will increase relative to the European 
average. At the same time, levels of GDP per capita in 
France, Italy, Spain and other countries in Southern 
Europe (and even in the UK) will decline relative to the 
European average (See Table 1 on next page). 
Moreover, across Europe as a whole the average debt 
level, as a % of GDP, would decline from 87% in 2013 to 
only 86% in 2020, and would still be 76% in 2030. France’s 
debt level would worsen from 93% in 2013 to 103% of 
GDP in 2030 and the debt levels of both Italy and Spain 
would remain close to 100% in 2030.
Hence, projections based on continuation of current 
fiscal policies suggest that the EU would be driven into an 
economic and political dead-end. Not only does the EU, 
and Europe as a whole, need to revive economic growth 
and employment, but also it needs to overcome the 
widening disparities in levels of income per capita among 
its member countries.
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Nordic Countries 138 155 181
United Kingdom 118 111 92
France 113 102 86
Italy 94 92 82




These broad-brush projections highlight what more detailed 
analysis reinforces: Europe needs to radically change course 
economically, and the sooner the better. The rest of this 
Policy Brief summarises some of the key policies that could 
help the EU move in such a progressive economic direction.
Progressive Policy Options
The EU faces the dual challenge of implementing policies 
that not only revive aggregate demand within Europe as 
a whole but also contribute to rebalancing the divergent 
competitive positions of countries within the Union.
Particularly important will be the boosting of both public 
and private investment in order to generate broader 
employment along with rising productivity. Policy 
interventions also need to ensure that there will be a more 
equitable distribution of employment and incomes across 
countries.
This goal will help ensure that all countries in Europe are 
included in a common effort to secure a viable pattern of 
trade, investment and financial flows within the continent 
and with the rest of the world.
The vital task of reviving aggregate demand in Europe will 
not be compatible, however, with the current self-defeating 
focus on slashing the public spending of heavily indebted 
governments. Instead, special assistance will be needed 
to enable such governments to return more gradually to 
sustainable levels of fiscal deficits and public debt.
Specifying Policy Targets
Table 2 draws on projections by the CAM macro model 
to 2030 to estimate the average growth rates of labour 
supply, employment, productivity and GDP that would be 
necessary to achieve Europe’s economic revival along with 
a more equitable pattern of income levels.
The projections assume 1) increased labour force 
participation (primarily for women and the elderly), 2) a fall 
of the unemployment rate in each country to 5-8%, and 3) 
a rise in each country’s productivity level towards that of 
Germany.
These objectives imply that between 2014 and 2030 Europe 
as a whole will need to grow at about 2.7% per year, based 
on an underlying growth rate of employment of 0.9% and 
of productivity of 1.8%.
Convergence within Europe will be achieved so long as 1) 
Germany, other countries in Western Europe and the Nordic 
countries are growing slower than the average (i.e., 1-2%) 
while 2) countries in Southern Europe, such as Italy and 
Spain, and in Eastern Europe will be growing faster than av-
erage (i.e., 3-5%).
New EU Investment Programmes
But such economic convergence will be dependent on re-
viving investment through concerted industrial policies 
and location policies across Europe. These efforts will have 
to significantly exceed, for example, current efforts of the 
EU’s Structural Funds and the European Investment Bank.
Of course, one option could be to increase investment 
through direct fiscal support from the EU’s budget. But 
a more feasible approach would be the issuance of Euro 
Bonds by the EU in its own name. Provided that such bonds 
are backed by the European Central Bank, they will raise 
substantial international financing at a relatively low cost.
Most importantly, such financing could support ambitious 
public investment programmes that promote both 
economic recovery and convergence of productivity across 
EU member countries. Such investment would support, for
1998-2007 2008-2013 2014-2030
Projected
GDP 2.2 -0.2 2.7
Employment 0.9 -0.4 0.9
Productivity 1.3 0.2 1.8
Labour Supply 0.6 0.3 0.6
Table 2. Average growth rates of GDP, 
employment and productivity
Table 1. Per Capita GDP 
relative to the European average
Source: CAM Modelling 
Source: CAM Modelling 
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example, long-term projects that build vital infrastructure 
in transport and communication, protect the environment 
and advance health and education.
EU financing of public investment could also provide a lever 
for location policies offering benefits to enterprises that 
agree to locate new or expanded facilities in regions that 
need accelerated economic development.
Between 2008 and 2013 average investment as a % of GDP 
across Europe as a whole dropped from 18.6% to a very 
low 15.6% (Table 3). The CAM macro model projects that 
implementation of the public policies outlined above could 
boost this average investment ratio back up to 20.1% by 
2020 and to 22.3% by 2030. 
But in order to promote greater convergence within Europe, 
the investment ratio in the countries of Southern Europe 
would have to be increased substantially, to a range of 25-
28% by 2030. At the same time, the investment ratios of 
Germany and other countries in Western Europe would be 
maintained at 19-20%. The UK’s investment ratio would be 
about the same while France’s would be 22%.
Strategic Location Policies
In tandem with public investment programmes, stronger 
and more strategic location policies need to be implemented 
in order to improve the distribution of trade and investment 
between countries and regions. 
While EU Structural Funds have been targeted, up until 
now, at poor regions within countries, location policies
need to be scaled up to focus resources, in addition, at the
national level. Not only should they be designed to upgrade
the competitiveness of lower-income countries but also 
they should seek to reverse declining competitiveness in 
higher-income countries. Such comprehensive efforts will 
contribute to the rebalancing of economic advantages 
across Europe as a whole.
Unfortunately, in the absence of EU coordination, the 
competition to convince European and international firms 
to set up operations in a particular location is usually won 
by high-income regions that have already managed to 
attract sizeable clusters of successful industries, particularly 
manufacturing and service firms specialising in exports.
Thus, development agencies need to be activated at 
both the national and sub-national level in order to help 
negotiate agreements that contribute to rebalancing 
competitive advantages across Europe as a whole. Such 
support is particularly important in the area of innovation 
and technology policies, which tend to favour firms already 
at the high-tech end of the spectrum.
Social Policies
In times of economic difficulty, when governments are 
pressured to balance budgets by reducing transfers and 
cutting social services, the principles of ‘Social Europe’ are 
particularly relevant. Europe is noteworthy for having a 
well-established social welfare system. But this system is 
currently under serious threat.
However, as part of any European economic recovery 
programme, there is a strong case, in fact, for maintaining 
social programmes, particularly in lower-income countries 
and regions. This includes vital programmes for health, 
education and care for children and the elderly. 
Maintaining social spending at decent levels need not, 
in fact, be costly. Based on analysis of government social 
spending (adjusted for the greater need of dependents, 
such as children, the young and the elderly), the CAM 
model projects that the yearly financial cost of maintaining 
common standards across the EU would be 0.9% of its 
combined GDP through 2030 (See Table 4 on next page). 
The projections show that between 2020 and 2030, initially 
significant social costs for Southern Europe would decline 
while corresponding costs for countries such as France and 
the UK would rise. 
The EU contribution to such social spending could be fi-
nanced in the same way that this Policy Brief has advocated 
for strategic public investment, namely, through Euro Bonds 
backed by the ECB.
ECB Financing of Debt
Unfortunately, none of the policies outlined above—which 
include public investment programmes, strategic location 
policies, and social policies—will be feasible if the onerous 
public debt of many governments across Europe is not di-
rectly addressed. 







Europe 18.6 15.6 20.1 22.3
Germany 17.0 16.6 19.8 19.7
Other Western 
Europe
19.1 16.8 19.2 19.2
Nordic 
Countries
18.1 15.7 17.1 16.2
United 
Kingdom
14.5 13.5 16.6 19.5
France 18.1 16.6 19.7 22.0
Italy 18.9 15.6 21.9 26.0
Spain 24.7 15.5 22.3 27.7
Other Southern 
Europe
18.4 9.0 17.2 25.0
Source: CAM Modelling 
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As already indicated, CAM projections suggest that the av-
erage debt of Europe as a whole will remain relatively high, 
even by 2030 (well above 60% of GDP). High debt levels will 
particularly be the case for major countries such as France, 
Italy and Spain.
Poorer countries such as Greece and Portugal will continue 
to face a very bleak future indeed. Hence, some mechanism 
for the EU-wide financing of their debt burdens, such as 
through a ‘lender of last resort’ function, is badly needed.
The mandate of the existing European Stability Mechanism 
is far too limited for this purpose, and its conditionalities far 
too burdensome. Hence, the European Central Bank should 
be mandated to fulfil this requisite function for debt-dis-
tressed countries.
In 2013, the average government debt across Europe as a 
whole represented 87% of the continent’s combined GDP. 
About 30% of this debt was financed by domestic banks 
and the other 70% by international lenders. 
In 2020 when the Europe-wide debt is projected by the CAM 
model to still be 76% of GDP, the ECB is assumed to account 
for about 10% of its financing, thereby critically reducing 
the role of international lenders, which tend to charge high 
interest rates. By 2030 such ECB financing is most likely to








Other Southern Europe 2.5 1.3
Source: CAM Modelling 
be reduced to a small residual amount, focused on sup-
porting only the worst-affected countries in Southern 
Europe. Hence, the overall cost of such debt financing 
should be manageable for the EU.
Summary Remarks
This Policy Brief has drawn on a much longer background 
Memorandum in order to chart out an ambitious but cred-
ible strategy for economic recovery in Europe. This strategy 
stands in stark contrast to current policies of sustained fiscal 
austerity. 
The proposed recovery strategy has two major compo-
nents: 1) significantly expanding aggregate demand, par-
ticularly public and private investment, and 2) explicitly 
allocating resources in order to rebalance the differentials 
in competitiveness that have widened across Europe since 
2000. Thus, this strategy is both expansionary and broadly 
redistributive.
The Policy Brief has focused on the implications of such a 
strategy for public investment programmes, strategic loca-
tion policies and social programmes. The costs of such in-
terventions have been examined and how they could be 
feasibly financed has also been identified.
In addressing costs in particular, the Policy Brief offers pro-
posals on how the onerous debt burden of many EU mem-
ber states could be reasonably managed and adequately fi-
nanced—affording them, as a consequence, the fiscal space 
to undertake the more expansionary economic and social 
policies that a credible recovery strategy would imply.
The AUGUR project brought together six research groups in Europe 
plus associates in Brazil, China, India, and South Africa to examine 
prospects for Europe and other parts of the world under alternative 
hypotheses about patterns of both global governance and European 
governance. The final research papers from the project are available 
in the following book: Eatwell, John, Terry McKinley and Pascal Petit 
(eds) (2014). Challenges for Europe in the World, 2030. Surrey, United 
Kingdom and Burlington, Vermont (USA): Ashgate.
